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From: Irish Foreign Affairs: Articles |
Date: July, 2009 |
By: Documents:Kovaliov Sergei Nikolayevich |
Inventions and falsifications concerning the role of the Soviet Union |
Inventions and falsifications concerning the role of the Soviet Union in the events leading to the Second World War. By Kovaliov Sergei Nikolayevich [This article first appeared in the Review "Voenno-istoricheskij zhurnal" (Review of Military History) No 7, 2008, then in mid 2009 it was published on the website of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and removed shortly after its appearance.] [Kovaliov Sergei Nikolayevich is Head of the Department of Military History of the North-West Region, attached to the institute of military history of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. He is a Colonel and holds a Doctorate in history (St Petersburg).] 4th June 2009 Numerous studies, by politicians, learned individuals, specialists and civil society, have analysed the role of the USSR in the events leading up to the start of the Second World War. Today anti-Russian attacks regarding this time are often based on falsified and distorted interpretations of the actions of the leadership of the USSR at this period. The idea appears more and more in the media that ‘a new Cold War has started’. (1) Some Western commentators say that : ’Now it is time to acknowledge the inconvenient truth. Russia is back: It is curious to note how easily labels are stuck on countries that are historically linked to Russia. For example it is said that some European countries, such as Bulgaria, Latvia and Moldavia, have already surrendered to Russia. (3) In their effort to throw the responsibility of starting the Second World War on the USSR, or at least to say that both bloody dictators, Stalin and Hitler, bear equal responsibility, modern falsifiers of history often use as their favourite argument the signing on 23 August 1939 of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. Poland and German demands Historical facts should be examined in context, taking into account events happening in a real situation. When we analyse the German-Soviet pact, we must not forget another agreement, signed around a year previously, in Munich. The two events are intimately linked. It is precisely what happened in the Bavarian capital which determined a great deal of subsequent Soviet policy. Everyone who has studied without preconceived ideas the history of the Second World War knows that it started because of the refusal of Poland to satisfy German requests. What is less well known is what precisely Hitler wanted from Warsaw. In reality, German demands were very moderate: to incorporate the free city of Danzig into the Third Reich, authorize the construction of a motorway and a railway line in order to link East Prussia with the main body of Germany. (4) These two demands have nothing extraordinary about them. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the city of Danzig, cut off from Germany following the Versailles Treaty, were Germans, (5) who sincerely desired to be joined again to their historical motherland. The request concerning the road was perfectly natural, especially since there were no pretensions concerning the territory of the ‘Polish corridor’ separating the two parts of Germany. Contrary to Western borders, Germany had never willingly recognised the territorial changes in the East imposed by the Versailles Treaty. (6) This is why, when on 24 October 1938 Germany proposed to Poland to settle the problem of Danzig and of the ‘Polish corridor’, (7) no difficulties were envisaged. Yet the refusal was categorical, and subsequent German requests met with the same response. Dreaming of becoming a great power, Poland did not want to become a subordinate partner of Germany. On 26 March 1939, Poland refused absolutely to satisfy German demands. (8) On 28 April 1939 the reaction of Germany was to annul the 1934 German-Polish pact of friendship and non-aggression. (9) Meanwhile Western democracies fostered in the Polish government the unrealistic hope that in case of war they would supply Warsaw with all necessary help. On 31 March 1939 Chamberlain, Prime Minister of Great Britain, declared publicly in the House of Commons: ‘In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence As subsequent events proved, these promises were pure deception. However the Polish government took them at face value, which caused it to lose all sense of reality. The American journalist William Shirer, who spent thirty years studying Polish life and society, has commented on the British guarantees given to Poland in the following manner:‘It is perfectly possible to insure a gunpowder factory, if security regulations are respected there, but to insure a factory run by madmen is another matter.’ (11) Alliance with Western Democracies The events occurring in Europe and the growing aggressiveness of Germany could not but seriously worry the Soviet Government. To restrain Hitler’s appetite it seemed necessary to make an alliance with Western democracies. However, as Churchill noted ‘The Soviet Government were convinced by Munich and much else that neither Britain nor France would fight till they were attacked and would not be much good then.’ (12) It was clear that the aim of the Western powers’ policy of ‘appeasement’ was to direct German aggression towards the East, that is to say, against the Soviet Union. As Chamberlain said on the 12 September 1938, on the eve of his meeting with Hitler, ‘Germany and Britain are the two pillars of European peace and the principal buttresses against communism, this is why it is essential to overcome our present difficulties through peace ... It will certainly be possible to find a solution acceptable for all, except Russia’. (13) In this situation the Soviet Government has drawn the only possible conclusion: collaboration with Britain and France is only possible on the basis of a military treaty outlining clearly and without ambiguity the obligations of the different parties. On 17 April 1939 Moscow proposed an Anglo-French-Soviet treaty of mutual aid containing the following points: 1. Britain, France and the USSR sign between them an agreement of 5 to 10 years duration by which they are mutually obliged to give each other immediately any useful help, including military, in case of aggression in Europe against one of the signatories. 2. Britain, France and the USSR commit themselves to bringing help, including military, to the countries of Central Europe situated between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea and having a common border with the USSR, in case of aggression against one of those countries. 3. Britain, France and the USSR commit themselves forthwith to discuss and establish how much and what sort of military aid will be offered to each of these states, in implementing paragraphs one and two. 4. The British Government stresses that the help it promised Poland concerns solely an attack coming from Germany. 5. The existing treaty between Poland and Rumania is either declared valid in case of aggression directed against Poland and Rumania, or else is entirely denounced as directed against the USSR. 6. Britain, France and the USSR commit themselves, after the start of military operations, to abstain from entering negotiations or declaring a separate peace with the aggressors independently of each other and without the common agreement of the three powers. 7. A corresponding agreement is signed at the same time as the Convention which must be written in virtue of paragraph 3. 8. Britain, France and the USSR find it necessary to start conjointly talks with Turkey with a view to an agreement of mutual help. (14) However the Western partners did not appreciate in the least this way of presenting things. On the 26 April, Lord Halifax, minister for Foreign Affairs, said that the time was not yet ripe for such a comprehensive proposal. (15) France and Great Britain hoped that the Soviet Union would enter into unilateral obligations. Thus, at a meeting of the Cabinet on 3 May, Halifax announced his intention to ask Russia if she would not now be ready to make a unilateral declaration saying that she would deliver aid at the time and in the form that would be considered acceptable by Poland and Rumania. (16) On 6 May 1939, the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Germany sent a communication to the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs concerning the reaction of the German press to the change of People’s Commissar, saying that the German press was trying to ‘give the impression that our policy might change in a way that would be favourable to them (giving up collective security, etc).' (17) The previous day, 5 May, K. Schnurre, head of the Commercial Policy Division of German Foreign Affairs (Eastern Europe) invited ambassador Merkalov who was leaving that day for Moscow and told him that the German government was of the opinion that the contracts entered into by the former commercial agent in Prague with the Skoda factory should be fulfilled. Indications to that effect had been given to the military authorities and to the Skoda factory, he added, and there would no longer be any obstacle to the firm honouring its obligations. (18) It was an obvious gesture on the part of the Germans, when as recently as the 17 April Soviet representatives in Berlin had protested against ‘the interference of the German military authorities’ in the normal economic activity of the Commercial Representation. (19) Molotov was in no hurry to respond to German signals. He was still involved in active negotiations with Great Britain and France through their diplomatic representatives in Moscow. On the 8 May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs received Sir William Seeds the British ambassador who conveyed to him his government’s reply to the Soviet proposal concerning a pact of mutual aid. The reply was discouraging. The British government proposed that the Soviet government publish a declaration in which it would commit itself ‘in the event that Great Britain and France should be involved, as a result of their undertakings, in military operations, to give them every help immediately’. (20) Thus the British refused to give a concrete answer regarding the pact, reducing it instead to a simple declaration of intent. That same day, the People’s Commissar communicated to the Soviet chargÈ d’affaires in France Jakob Surits the British proposal and asked him to convey urgently his opinion on the question. (21) In a telegram sent to the minister on 10 May Surits made the following comment on the British proposal: ‘it would take us automatically into a war with Germany’ because of ‘commitments given without our agreement and without concertation’ to Britain and France’. (22) From this and from other similar considerations the minister formulated his position. On 14 May Molotov summoned the British ambassador Seeds and handed him a written note containing the reply to the British proposal. This said that ‘the British proposals do not show principles of reciprocity towards Regarding the soviet proposals, the chargé d’affaires in London Maisky noted in his diary that they had put ‘the British government in a very difficult situation. Our proposals are clear, It is only on 25 July that the British government and the next day the French government accepted the Soviet proposal to proceed with talks regarding the signing of a military convention, and declared themselves ready to send their representatives to Moscow. (26) The talks started on 12 August. The particulars of these talks, which ended in failure, are too well known for it to be worth repeating them here. We should however pay special attention to the real objectives pursued by the parties involved. The British delegation on leaving for Moscow had been given instructions ‘to conduct the talks very slowly’ (27) and avoid concrete obligations: ‘the British government does not wish to be bound by any obligation which could tie our hands regardless of circumstances. This is why as far as a military agreement is concerned it is essential that we limit ourselves to the most general of formulations.’ (28) The position of the Soviet leaders is entirely different. The head of the French delegation, General Doumenc, is his report on the conduct of the talks, stated in a telegram of 17 August 1939 sent to the French Defence Minister: ‘There is no doubt that the The role of Poland The main stumbling block was the question of the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Rumania, since at that time the USSR had no common border with Germany. For this reason it was not clear how, when hostilities were declared, Soviet troops could meet and fight the German army. At the meeting of military delegations of 14 August 1939 Marshall Vorochilov asked the following concrete question: ‘The general scheme of things is clear, but we do not understand the position In order that the Red Army be in a position from the beginning to take part in military operations, it was necessary that Soviet troops be able to cross Polish territory. Besides, the zones of passage were strictly delimited: the Vilno corridor and Galicia. (31) The head of the French delegation, General Doumenc, in a telegram to the French War Minister of 15 August stresses: ‘We must note the importance, to allay Polish fears, of the fact However the Poles would not listen. Thus, on the evening of 19 August 1940 [sic] Marshall Rydz-Smigly declared: ‘Whatever the consequences, we will not accept that an inch of Polish And the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs declared to the French ambassador in Warsaw: ‘We will never assent to a discussion in whatever form of the A report of the second section (intelligence) of the High Command of the armies of Poland, dated December 1938, stresses that: ‘The dismantling of Russia forms the basis of Polish policy in the East In the course of the talks with Britain and France the Soviet government became convinced once more of the correctness of the words of a Lithuanian diplomat quoted by Astakhov in his diary: ‘In case of war, the USSR will bear the greatest losses, whereas Seeing its requests rejected by Britain and France, the USSR signed a pact of non aggression with Germany. From a moral point of view, it should be noted that no representative of the Western democracies has a right to judge the agreement between the USSR and Germany. As the American journalist Shirer so justly remarked: ‘If Chamberlain was right and honourable in appeasing Hitler in September 1938 by sacrificing Czechoslovakia, was Stalin wrong and dishonourable in appeasing the Fuehrer a year later at the expense of Poland, which had shunned Soviet help anyway?’ (37) You could say the same of critics who judge from the standpoint of Leninist norms of foreign policy, which the USSR had supposedly violated by signing an agreement with Germany. The Soviet Union signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany and the result was that, instead of forming a bloc against her, Germany on the one hand and Britain with France on the other hand started to fight each other. The USSR gained the chance of entering the war later than the others, keeping moreover a certain freedom of choice regarding the side it would choose to engage with. The Soviet leadership, analysing the course of events leading up to the Second World War, drew the conclusion expressed by Stalin on 7 September 1939 in a discussion with the leaders of the Komintern: ‘The war is happening between two groups of capitalist countries ... We must not forget either that during the summer of 1939 Soviet troops were involved in tough fighting against the Japanese on the Khalkhin-Gol river. In as much as Japan was the ally of Germany in the anti-Komintern pact, the signing of the German-Soviet pact was interpreted in Tokyo as a betrayal. On this subject the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Japan said: ‘The announcement of the pact of non-aggression between the USSR Relations between the Third Reich and its Far Eastern ally were spoiled for a long time as a result. Consequently, leading Japanese circles made the choice of the South Plan, necessitating a war against Britain and the USA. As is known, after the German attack on the USSR, Japan did not declare war on the Soviet Union. Thus by signing on 19 August 1939 an economic agreement and on 23 August the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the USSR managed for a time to keep war from its borders. The Soviet government took very seriously the ideas proclaimed by Hitler since 1925 in ‘Mein Kampf’ on ‘expansion towards the East’ and the extension of German living space at the expense of the Soviet Union, ideas many times repeated by him before and after his rise to power, as for example during his first meeting with the generals of the Reichwehr on 3 February 1933. However, in his ‘gradual plan’ of aggression, as the German historian Hillgruber called it, Hitler still had go through several stages before realising his plan to ‘squash bolshevism’; he started in 1938 (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel), then in 1939 (Poland) and finally in 1940 (Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France). Even during the period when the Soviet-German pact was operative, he repeated often that ‘his foreign policy would always aim at the destruction of bolshevism’ (according to Hitler’s aide de camp Colonel von Bulow). On 22 August 1939, justifying to his generals the signing of the pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union, Hitler declared that ‘nevertheless he would crush the USSR later’. As early as 17 October 1939 he gave the order to prepare the ex Polish territories for ‘a deployment of forces’ (40). Just before attacking France, Hitler indicated that after this operation the Wehrmacht would have to be ready for ‘great operations in the East’. Evaluation of the 1939 Pact Unfortunately it was not possible for the Soviets to fully realise their plans. The Western powers were very easily beaten and Hitler became master of the resources of practically the whole of Europe. However, even if these circumstances are taken into account, the Soviet-German pact was at the time the best decision in the conditions obtaining in August 1939. Considering the threat of war, the Kremlin decided to accept the pressing propositions coming from Germany to improve the relations between the two countries. Besides, German diplomats let it be understood that they were ready to make important concessions to meet the wishes of the USSR (41). Later, after the end of the war, Churchill in his memoirs wrote on the subject of the Soviet-German pact: ‘It is a question whether Hitler or Stalin loathed it most. Both were In the arguments in favour of the detachment of the Baltic republics from the USSR, whether in the nineties or today, we hear most often the assertion that the Treaty of 23 August 1939 had led to ‘a Soviet annexation’ of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in other words the theme of a Soviet occupation is exploited thoroughly. It should be noted that the earliest date for the start of the period of occupation is fixed to the summer months of 1940, when the parliaments of the Baltic countries voted for their uniting with the USSR. In virtue of which, even the extreme partisanship of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian historians does not allow them to consider the entry of Soviet troops as an act of occupation, and thus they recognise indirectly its objective legitimacy. It is also difficult to deny the fact that for their part the Soviets respected fully the articles of the pact of mutual aid, refusing to interfere in the internal political life of the Baltic States. The war in Europe, considered by the Soviet government as a real harbinger of conflict with Germany in the short term (signed in August 1939, the pact was only considered as a momentary respite) led to the search for new guarantees of security. These guarantees were obtained by signing treaties with the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, leading to the creation of Soviet military bases on the territory of the Baltic states: not only on a purely military level, but also on a political level, in as much as these treaties represented an obstacle to the military and political rapprochement of these countries with Germany. Churchill, explaining the vital necessity for the USSR to improve its strategic positions on the eve of war with Germany, noted: ‘They must be in occupation of the Baltic States and a large part of Before passing judgement on the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the Baltic States, one must not forget that the international community of the time had received this fact as natural, as an objective unavoidable measure, and not as the expression of expansionist plans. In reality, these events resulted from the fact that all through the thirties, the main European powers had refused to grant the Baltic states any guarantees whatsoever, considering as inevitable their absorption either by Germany or by the USSR. Soviet leaders could not be content to observe passively the Baltic states turn into a zone of German interests, with all the consequences that would flow from that. The decision to sign the treaties was taken because the great powers of Europe were not interested in the fate of the Baltic countries. Using the contradictions between Britain, France and Germany, the USSR managed to take control of a strategically important region, to reinforce its position on the Baltic Sea and to create a stronghold against East Prussia. We must also consider the space factor, which is indissolubly linked to the time factor. The greater the distance from which German troops would eventually start their attack, the smaller the chance of pursuing this attack successfully. The course of the Great Patriotic War demonstrated that this factor contributed to the failure of Hitler’s project. The German Soviet pact of 23 August 1939 which is used in the Baltic states in order to accuse the Russian Federation, as legal heir of the USSR, of entering into secret agreements to annex Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (we should add: at the express request of the government and parliaments of these states) was perfectly in line with international law. All these treaties, this one included, are inscribed on the register of League of Nations, which only sovereign states could be members of, as subjects of international law. It should also be noted that neither the dispositions of the treaty of 23 August 1939 nor the verbal agreements reached during consultations fixed any borders of state between the countries. The convention signed between the USSR and Germany on friendship and borders on 28 September 1939 is in reality an agreement on the ‘non-interference’ of these countries in ‘the limits or territory of the states involved’. (44) Thus, the fact of declaring Lithuania and an important part of Poland ‘spheres of influence’ of Germany, meant in effect, in the practical relationship between the USSR and Germany, that ‘the USSR would not declare war if German troops entered the territory of these countries’. (45) Soviet leaders, having signed new agreements on the disposition of extra contingents of Soviet troops and naval forces in June 1940, to complement the agreements signed in the autumn of 1939, deployed these troops and started to prepare and make operational the lines of defence in anticipation of an attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. For the sake of historical truth, it should be said that a large part of the responsibility in the failure of efforts to create a collective counterweight to fascist aggression falls also on the ‘small’ countries of Europe. Their romantic faith in the justice and protection of western democracies, together with their flirtation with fascist Germany and their anti-Soviet prejudice (often coloured with a Russophobe aspect) turned them for a time into pawns on the world political chessboard, making them incapable of influencing the course of events. [Translation: M. Dunlop and C. Winch] Notes: 1) http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/239456.html (The author of the article, Abik Elkin, quotes principally the British journalist Edward Lucas and several of his articles, e.g. Why kowtow to brutal, cynical Russia? 2) ibid. 3) ibid. 4) Meltiukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish Wars: Military and Political Standoff in 1918-1939 Moscow EKSMO 2004 p285 5) In 1924, 95% of the 384 000 inhabitants of Danzig were German (see Great Soviet Encyclopedia, volume 20 6) ibid 7) Meltiukhov, op.cit. p 285 8) ibid p 294 9) The crisis year, 1938-1939: Documents and Materials Volume 2 [2 June – 4 Sept 39] Moscow Politizdat 1990 p 392 10) op.cit. volume 1 [29 Sept 38- 31 May 39] p 351 11) Quoted in Fuller J.F.C. The Second World War1939- 1945, a Strategical and Tactical History. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956 p37 12) W. Churchill The Second World War in 3 volumes; Moscow, Voenizdat 1991 Volume 1 Tome 1 p 173 13) The Crisis Year Volume 1 p6 14) ibid. pp 386-387 15) ibid. Volume 2 p 391 16) ibid 17) Documents of Foreign Policy [USSR] 1939 Tome XXII in 2 volumes Moscow 1992 volume 1 January-August p 339 18) ibid. p 338 19) The Crisis Year Volume 1 p 389 20) ibid pp 438-439 21) Documents of Foreign Policy [USSR] 1939 Tome XXII volume 1 p 342 22) ibid. p 355 23) ibid. p 363 24) Short History of the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs 1802-2002 in 3 volumes; volume 2: 1917-2002, Moscow, OLMA Press 2002, p245 25) Archives of Foreign Policy of the Federation of Russia. F. 017a.Op1 p1 d6 l 130 26) The Crisis Year Volume 2 p 403 27) Documents and Materials on the Eve of the Second world War 1937-1939. Collection of Materials in 2 Volumes. Volume 2 January-August 1939; Moscow 1981 p 168 28) The Crisis Year Volume 2 pp 192-193 29) ibid p 267 30) ibid p 212 31) ibid p 216 32) ibid pp 228-229 33) Mosley L. On Borrowed Time, How World War Two Began Translated and abridged by Fedotov; Moscow, Voenizdat 1972 p 301 34) The Crisis Year Volume 2 p 279 35) Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materialy. T. III. Warszawa, 1968; pp.262, 287 36) Documents of Foreign Policy [USSR] 1939 Tome XXII volume 1 p 588 37) [Shirer W.L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Pan 1964 p 659 (Tr.)] 38) The Year 1941 in 2 volumes Moscow ‘Democratia’ International Fund 1998 p 584 39) The Crisis Year Volume 2 p 322 40) Cf.†: Generaloberst Halder F. Kriegstagebuch. T‰gliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939- 1942. Stuttgart; W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962-1964; Bd.1. Vom Polenfeldzug bis zum Ende der Westoffensive (14.8.1939 – 30.6.1940); Stuttgart; W. Kohlhammer VI, 1962; p. 107 41) Short History of the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs 1802-2002 volume 2 p 255 42) Churchill op.cit. pp 179-180 43) ibid 44) Emelyanov I. The Baltic States. Moscow, Bystrow editor; 2007 p 232 45) ibid p 233 46) Short History of the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs volume 2 p 255 |