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From: Irish Foreign Affairs: Articles
Date: July, 2009
By: Documents:Kovaliov Sergei Nikolayevich

Inventions and falsifications concerning the role of the Soviet Union

Inventions and falsifications concerning the role of the Soviet Union in the events
leading to the Second World War.
By Kovaliov Sergei Nikolayevich

[This article first appeared in the Review "Voenno-istoricheskij
zhurnal" (Review of Military History) No 7, 2008, then in mid
2009 it was published on the website of the Russian Ministry of
Defence, and removed shortly after its appearance.]
[Kovaliov Sergei Nikolayevich is Head of the Department of
Military History of the North-West Region, attached to the
institute of military history of the Ministry of Defence of the
Russian Federation. He is a Colonel and holds a Doctorate in
history (St Petersburg).]
4th June 2009

Numerous studies, by politicians, learned individuals, specialists
and civil society, have analysed the role of the USSR in
the events leading up to the start of the Second World War. Today
anti-Russian attacks regarding this time are often based on
falsified and distorted interpretations of the actions of the leadership
of the USSR at this period. The idea appears more and more
in the media that ‘a new Cold War has started’. (1) Some Western
commentators say that :

’Now it is time to acknowledge the inconvenient truth. Russia is back:
rich, powerful and hostile. Partnership is giving way to rivalry, with
increasingly threatening overtones. The new Cold War has begun – but
just as in the 1940s, we are alarmingly slow to notice it.’ [Times 5/2/08]
(2)


It is curious to note how easily labels are stuck on countries
that are historically linked to Russia. For example it is said that
some European countries, such as Bulgaria, Latvia and Moldavia,
have already surrendered to Russia. (3)
In their effort to throw the responsibility of starting the Second
World War on the USSR, or at least to say that both bloody
dictators, Stalin and Hitler, bear equal responsibility, modern
falsifiers of history often use as their favourite argument the
signing on 23 August 1939 of the non-aggression pact between
Germany and the Soviet Union.

Poland and German demands

Historical facts should be examined in context, taking into
account events happening in a real situation. When we analyse
the German-Soviet pact, we must not forget another agreement,
signed around a year previously, in Munich. The two events are
intimately linked. It is precisely what happened in the Bavarian
capital which determined a great deal of subsequent Soviet
policy. Everyone who has studied without preconceived ideas
the history of the Second World War knows that it started because
of the refusal of Poland to satisfy German requests. What is less
well known is what precisely Hitler wanted from Warsaw. In
reality, German demands were very moderate: to incorporate the
free city of Danzig into the Third Reich, authorize the construction
of a motorway and a railway line in order to link East Prussia
with the main body of Germany. (4) These two demands have
nothing extraordinary about them. The overwhelming majority
of the inhabitants of the city of Danzig, cut off from Germany
following the Versailles Treaty, were Germans, (5) who sincerely
desired to be joined again to their historical motherland.
The request concerning the road was perfectly natural, especially
since there were no pretensions concerning the territory of the
‘Polish corridor’ separating the two parts of Germany. Contrary
to Western borders, Germany had never willingly recognised the
territorial changes in the East imposed by the Versailles Treaty.
(6)
This is why, when on 24 October 1938 Germany proposed to
Poland to settle the problem of Danzig and of the ‘Polish
corridor’, (7) no difficulties were envisaged. Yet the refusal was
categorical, and subsequent German requests met with the same
response. Dreaming of becoming a great power, Poland did not
want to become a subordinate partner of Germany. On 26 March
1939, Poland refused absolutely to satisfy German demands. (8)
On 28 April 1939 the reaction of Germany was to annul the 1934
German-Polish pact of friendship and non-aggression. (9)
Meanwhile Western democracies fostered in the Polish government
the unrealistic hope that in case of war they would supply
Warsaw with all necessary help. On 31 March 1939 Chamberlain,
Prime Minister of Great Britain, declared publicly in the
House of Commons:

‘In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence
... His Majesty’s government would feel themselves bound at once
to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have
given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that
the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they
stand in the same position in this matter as His Majesty’s Government.’
(10)


As subsequent events proved, these promises were pure
deception. However the Polish government took them at face
value, which caused it to lose all sense of reality. The American
journalist William Shirer, who spent thirty years studying Polish
life and society, has commented on the British guarantees given
to Poland in the following manner:‘It is perfectly possible to
insure a gunpowder factory, if security regulations are respected
there, but to insure a factory run by madmen is another matter.’
(11)

Alliance with Western Democracies

The events occurring in Europe and the growing aggressiveness
of Germany could not but seriously worry the Soviet
Government. To restrain Hitler’s appetite it seemed necessary to
make an alliance with Western democracies. However, as
Churchill noted ‘The Soviet Government were convinced by
Munich and much else that neither Britain nor France would fight
till they were attacked and would not be much good then.’ (12) It
was clear that the aim of the Western powers’ policy of ‘appeasement’
was to direct German aggression towards the East, that is
to say, against the Soviet Union. As Chamberlain said on the 12
September 1938, on the eve of his meeting with Hitler,
‘Germany and Britain are the two pillars of European peace and the
principal buttresses against communism, this is why it is essential to
overcome our present difficulties through peace ... It will certainly be
possible to find a solution acceptable for all, except Russia’. (13)
In this situation the Soviet Government has drawn the only
possible conclusion: collaboration with Britain and France is
only possible on the basis of a military treaty outlining clearly and
without ambiguity the obligations of the different parties.
On 17 April 1939 Moscow proposed an Anglo-French-Soviet
treaty of mutual aid containing the following points:

1. Britain, France and the USSR sign between them an
agreement of 5 to 10 years duration by which they are mutually
obliged to give each other immediately any useful help, including
military, in case of aggression in Europe against one of the
signatories.
2. Britain, France and the USSR commit themselves to
bringing help, including military, to the countries of Central
Europe situated between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea and
having a common border with the USSR, in case of aggression
against one of those countries.
3. Britain, France and the USSR commit themselves forthwith
to discuss and establish how much and what sort of military
aid will be offered to each of these states, in implementing
paragraphs one and two.
4. The British Government stresses that the help it promised
Poland concerns solely an attack coming from Germany.
5. The existing treaty between Poland and Rumania is
either declared valid in case of aggression directed against Poland
and Rumania, or else is entirely denounced as directed against the
USSR.
6. Britain, France and the USSR commit themselves, after
the start of military operations, to abstain from entering negotiations
or declaring a separate peace with the aggressors independently
of each other and without the common agreement of the
three powers.
7. A corresponding agreement is signed at the same time as
the Convention which must be written in virtue of paragraph 3.
8. Britain, France and the USSR find it necessary to start
conjointly talks with Turkey with a view to an agreement of
mutual help. (14)

However the Western partners did not appreciate in the least
this way of presenting things. On the 26 April, Lord Halifax,
minister for Foreign Affairs, said that the time was not yet ripe for
such a comprehensive proposal. (15) France and Great Britain
hoped that the Soviet Union would enter into unilateral obligations.
Thus, at a meeting of the Cabinet on 3 May, Halifax
announced his intention to ask Russia if she would not now be
ready to make a unilateral declaration saying that she would
deliver aid at the time and in the form that would be considered
acceptable by Poland and Rumania. (16)

On 6 May 1939, the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Germany sent
a communication to the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs
concerning the reaction of the German press to the change of
People’s Commissar, saying that the German press was trying to
‘give the impression that our policy might change in a way that
would be favourable to them (giving up collective security, etc).'
(17) The previous day, 5 May, K. Schnurre, head of the Commercial
Policy Division of German Foreign Affairs (Eastern Europe)
invited ambassador Merkalov who was leaving that day for
Moscow and told him that the German government was of the
opinion that the contracts entered into by the former commercial
agent in Prague with the Skoda factory should be fulfilled.
Indications to that effect had been given to the military authorities
and to the Skoda factory, he added, and there would no longer be
any obstacle to the firm honouring its obligations. (18)
It was an obvious gesture on the part of the Germans, when as
recently as the 17 April Soviet representatives in Berlin had
protested against ‘the interference of the German military authorities’
in the normal economic activity of the Commercial
Representation. (19)

Molotov was in no hurry to respond to German signals. He
was still involved in active negotiations with Great Britain and
France through their diplomatic representatives in Moscow. On
the 8 May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs received Sir William
Seeds the British ambassador who conveyed to him his government’s
reply to the Soviet proposal concerning a pact of mutual
aid. The reply was discouraging. The British government
proposed that the Soviet government publish a declaration in
which it would commit itself ‘in the event that Great Britain and
France should be involved, as a result of their undertakings, in
military operations, to give them every help immediately’. (20)
Thus the British refused to give a concrete answer regarding the
pact, reducing it instead to a simple declaration of intent.
That same day, the People’s Commissar communicated to the
Soviet chargÈ d’affaires in France Jakob Surits the British
proposal and asked him to convey urgently his opinion on the
question. (21) In a telegram sent to the minister on 10 May Surits
made the following comment on the British proposal: ‘it would
take us automatically into a war with Germany’ because of
‘commitments given without our agreement and without
concertation’ to Britain and France’. (22) From this and from
other similar considerations the minister formulated his position.
On 14 May Molotov summoned the British ambassador Seeds
and handed him a written note containing the reply to the British
proposal. This said that

‘the British proposals do not show principles of reciprocity towards
the USSR but put her in an unequal situation.
The Soviet Government considers that in order to create a real barrier
of peace loving countries against the development of aggression in
Europe it is necessary 1) to conclude a real pact of mutual aid against
aggression between Britain, France and the USSR; 2) to give the
guarantee of the three great powers to the threatened countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic countries and Finland; 3) to sign
an agreement between Britain, France and the USSR detailing unambiguously
the quantity and nature of the aid that would be given. ' (23)


Regarding the soviet proposals, the chargé d’affaires in London
Maisky noted in his diary that they had put
‘the British government in a very difficult situation. Our proposals are clear,
simple and full of common sense.’ (24) ‘On the other hand, the
guarantees given to Poland, Rumania and Greece make an
agreement with the Soviet Union absolutely necessary, in so far
as Great Britain and France will be unable to do anything concrete
for Poland or Rumania. Before the British blockade of Germany
could have any serious effect on Germany, Poland and Rumania
would have long ceased to exist.’ (25)


It is only on 25 July that the British government and the next
day the French government accepted the Soviet proposal to
proceed with talks regarding the signing of a military convention,
and declared themselves ready to send their representatives to
Moscow. (26) The talks started on 12 August.
The particulars of these talks, which ended in failure, are too
well known for it to be worth repeating them here. We should
however pay special attention to the real objectives pursued by
the parties involved. The British delegation on leaving for
Moscow had been given instructions ‘to conduct the talks very
slowly’ (27) and avoid concrete obligations: ‘the British government
does not wish to be bound by any obligation which could tie
our hands regardless of circumstances. This is why as far as a
military agreement is concerned it is essential that we limit
ourselves to the most general of formulations.’ (28)
The position of the Soviet leaders is entirely different. The
head of the French delegation, General Doumenc, is his report on
the conduct of the talks, stated in a telegram of 17 August 1939
sent to the French Defence Minister:

‘There is no doubt that the
USSR wishes to sign a military pact and does not want to be
presented with any sort of document that would not have concrete
value.’ (29)


The role of Poland

The main stumbling block was the question of the passage of
Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Rumania, since
at that time the USSR had no common border with Germany. For
this reason it was not clear how, when hostilities were declared,
Soviet troops could meet and fight the German army. At the
meeting of military delegations of 14 August 1939 Marshall
Vorochilov asked the following concrete question:
‘The general scheme of things is clear, but we do not understand the position
of the Soviet Union armed forces. It is not clear on what territory
they are deployed and how they take part physically in the general
fighting.’ (30)


In order that the Red Army be in a position from
the beginning to take part in military operations, it was necessary
that Soviet troops be able to cross Polish territory. Besides, the
zones of passage were strictly delimited: the Vilno corridor and
Galicia. (31) The head of the French delegation, General Doumenc,
in a telegram to the French War Minister of 15 August stresses:

‘We must note the importance, to allay Polish fears, of the fact
that the Russians limit very strictly the zones of entry [of soviet
troops], and adopt an exclusively strategic view point.’ (32)

However the Poles would not listen. Thus, on the evening of
19 August 1940 [sic] Marshall Rydz-Smigly declared:

‘Whatever the consequences, we will not accept that an inch of Polish
territory be occupied by Russian troops.’ (33)

And the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs declared to the
French ambassador in Warsaw:

‘We will never assent to a discussion in whatever form of the
possibility that a portion of our territory might by used by foreign
troops.’ (34)


A report of the second section (intelligence) of the High
Command of the armies of Poland, dated December 1938,
stresses that:

‘The dismantling of Russia forms the basis of Polish policy in the East
... This is why our position comes down to the following question: who
will take part in the dismantling. Poland must not remain passive in this
remarkable historic moment. Our task is to prepare ourselves in advance
physically and mentally ... The main objective is the weakening and
destruction of Russia.’ (35)


In the course of the talks with Britain and France the Soviet
government became convinced once more of the correctness of
the words of a Lithuanian diplomat quoted by Astakhov in his
diary:

‘In case of war, the USSR will bear the greatest losses, whereas
Britain and France will retreat and take cover, limiting themselves to an
exchange of shots and missiles. There will be no decisive actions on the
Western front.’ (36)


Seeing its requests rejected by Britain and France, the USSR
signed a pact of non aggression with Germany.
From a moral point of view, it should be noted that no
representative of the Western democracies has a right to judge the
agreement between the USSR and Germany. As the American
journalist Shirer so justly remarked:
‘If Chamberlain was right and honourable in appeasing Hitler in September 1938 by sacrificing Czechoslovakia, was Stalin wrong and dishonourable in appeasing the Fuehrer a year later at the expense of Poland, which had shunned Soviet help anyway?’ (37)


You could say the same of critics who judge from the
standpoint of Leninist norms of foreign policy, which the USSR
had supposedly violated by signing an agreement with Germany.
The Soviet Union signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany
and the result was that, instead of forming a bloc against her,
Germany on the one hand and Britain with France on the other
hand started to fight each other. The USSR gained the chance of
entering the war later than the others, keeping moreover a certain
freedom of choice regarding the side it would choose to engage
with.
The Soviet leadership, analysing the course of events leading
up to the Second World War, drew the conclusion expressed by
Stalin on 7 September 1939 in a discussion with the leaders of the
Komintern:

‘The war is happening between two groups of capitalist countries ...
for world domination! We are not against them getting into a scrap and
weakening each other ... we can manoeuvre, push one side against the
other, to make them fight yet a bit more.’ (38)


We must not forget either that during the summer of 1939
Soviet troops were involved in tough fighting against the Japanese
on the Khalkhin-Gol river. In as much as Japan was the ally
of Germany in the anti-Komintern pact, the signing of the
German-Soviet pact was interpreted in Tokyo as a betrayal. On
this subject the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Japan said:
‘The announcement of the pact of non-aggression between the USSR
and Germany has produced a shock here, deeply embarrassing
the militarists and the fascists.’ (39)


Relations between the Third Reich and its Far Eastern ally
were spoiled for a long time as a result. Consequently, leading
Japanese circles made the choice of the South Plan, necessitating
a war against Britain and the USA. As is known, after the German
attack on the USSR, Japan did not declare war on the Soviet
Union.

Thus by signing on 19 August 1939 an economic agreement
and on 23 August the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the USSR
managed for a time to keep war from its borders.
The Soviet government took very seriously the ideas proclaimed
by Hitler since 1925 in ‘Mein Kampf’ on ‘expansion
towards the East’ and the extension of German living space at the
expense of the Soviet Union, ideas many times repeated by him
before and after his rise to power, as for example during his first
meeting with the generals of the Reichwehr on 3 February 1933.
However, in his ‘gradual plan’ of aggression, as the German
historian Hillgruber called it, Hitler still had go through several
stages before realising his plan to ‘squash bolshevism’; he started
in 1938 (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel), then in 1939 (Poland)
and finally in 1940 (Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium,
France). Even during the period when the Soviet-German pact
was operative, he repeated often that
‘his foreign policy would always aim at the destruction of bolshevism’

(according to Hitler’s aide de camp Colonel von Bulow). On 22 August 1939,
justifying to his generals the signing of the pact of non-aggression
with the Soviet Union, Hitler declared that ‘nevertheless he
would crush the USSR later’. As early as 17 October 1939 he
gave the order to prepare the ex Polish territories for ‘a deployment
of forces’ (40). Just before attacking France, Hitler indicated
that after this operation the Wehrmacht would have to be
ready for ‘great operations in the East’.

Evaluation of the 1939 Pact

Unfortunately it was not possible for the Soviets to fully
realise their plans. The Western powers were very easily beaten
and Hitler became master of the resources of practically the
whole of Europe. However, even if these circumstances are taken
into account, the Soviet-German pact was at the time the best
decision in the conditions obtaining in August 1939. Considering
the threat of war, the Kremlin decided to accept the pressing
propositions coming from Germany to improve the relations
between the two countries. Besides, German diplomats let it be
understood that they were ready to make important concessions
to meet the wishes of the USSR (41).

Later, after the end of the war, Churchill in his memoirs wrote
on the subject of the Soviet-German pact:

‘It is a question whether Hitler or Stalin loathed it most. Both were
aware that it could only be a temporary expedient. The antagonisms
between the two empires and systems were mortal. Stalin no doubt felt
that Hitler would be a less deadly foe to Russia after a year of war with
the Western Powers. Hitler followed his method of 'One at a time'. The
fact that such an agreement could be made marks the culminating failure
of British and French foreign policy and diplomacy over several years.’
(42)


In the arguments in favour of the detachment of the Baltic
republics from the USSR, whether in the nineties or today, we
hear most often the assertion that the Treaty of 23 August 1939
had led to ‘a Soviet annexation’ of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
in other words the theme of a Soviet occupation is exploited
thoroughly. It should be noted that the earliest date for the start
of the period of occupation is fixed to the summer months of
1940, when the parliaments of the Baltic countries voted for their
uniting with the USSR. In virtue of which, even the extreme
partisanship of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian historians does
not allow them to consider the entry of Soviet troops as an act of
occupation, and thus they recognise indirectly its objective legitimacy.
It is also difficult to deny the fact that for their part the
Soviets respected fully the articles of the pact of mutual aid,
refusing to interfere in the internal political life of the Baltic
States.

The war in Europe, considered by the Soviet government as
a real harbinger of conflict with Germany in the short term
(signed in August 1939, the pact was only considered as a
momentary respite) led to the search for new guarantees of
security.

These guarantees were obtained by signing treaties with the
governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, leading to the
creation of Soviet military bases on the territory of the Baltic
states: not only on a purely military level, but also on a political
level, in as much as these treaties represented an obstacle to the
military and political rapprochement of these countries with
Germany.

Churchill, explaining the vital necessity for the USSR to
improve its strategic positions on the eve of war with Germany,
noted:

‘They must be in occupation of the Baltic States and a large part of
Poland by force or fraud before they were attacked. If their policy was
cold-blooded, it was also at the moment realistic in a high degree.’ (43)


Before passing judgement on the entry of Soviet troops into
the territory of the Baltic States, one must not forget that the
international community of the time had received this fact as
natural, as an objective unavoidable measure, and not as the
expression of expansionist plans. In reality, these events resulted
from the fact that all through the thirties, the main European
powers had refused to grant the Baltic states any guarantees
whatsoever, considering as inevitable their absorption either by
Germany or by the USSR. Soviet leaders could not be content to
observe passively the Baltic states turn into a zone of German
interests, with all the consequences that would flow from that.
The decision to sign the treaties was taken because the great
powers of Europe were not interested in the fate of the Baltic
countries. Using the contradictions between Britain, France and
Germany, the USSR managed to take control of a strategically
important region, to reinforce its position on the Baltic Sea and to
create a stronghold against East Prussia.

We must also consider the space factor, which is indissolubly
linked to the time factor. The greater the distance from which
German troops would eventually start their attack, the smaller the
chance of pursuing this attack successfully. The course of the
Great Patriotic War demonstrated that this factor contributed to
the failure of Hitler’s project.

The German Soviet pact of 23 August 1939 which is used in
the Baltic states in order to accuse the Russian Federation, as legal
heir of the USSR, of entering into secret agreements to annex
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (we should add: at the express
request of the government and parliaments of these states) was
perfectly in line with international law. All these treaties, this one
included, are inscribed on the register of League of Nations,
which only sovereign states could be members of, as subjects of
international law.

It should also be noted that neither the dispositions of the
treaty of 23 August 1939 nor the verbal agreements reached
during consultations fixed any borders of state between the
countries. The convention signed between the USSR and Germany
on friendship and borders on 28 September 1939 is in
reality an agreement on the ‘non-interference’ of these countries
in ‘the limits or territory of the states involved’. (44) Thus, the fact
of declaring Lithuania and an important part of Poland ‘spheres
of influence’ of Germany, meant in effect, in the practical
relationship between the USSR and Germany, that ‘the USSR
would not declare war if German troops entered the territory of
these countries’. (45)

Soviet leaders, having signed new agreements on the disposition
of extra contingents of Soviet troops and naval forces in June
1940, to complement the agreements signed in the autumn of
1939, deployed these troops and started to prepare and make
operational the lines of defence in anticipation of an attack by
Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union.

For the sake of historical truth, it should be said that a large
part of the responsibility in the failure of efforts to create a
collective counterweight to fascist aggression falls also on the
‘small’ countries of Europe. Their romantic faith in the justice
and protection of western democracies, together with their flirtation
with fascist Germany and their anti-Soviet prejudice (often
coloured with a Russophobe aspect) turned them for a time into
pawns on the world political chessboard, making them incapable
of influencing the course of events.
[Translation: M. Dunlop and C. Winch]

Notes:
1) http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/239456.html (The author
of the article, Abik Elkin, quotes principally the British
journalist Edward Lucas and several of his articles, e.g. Why
kowtow to brutal, cynical Russia?
2) ibid.
3) ibid.
4) Meltiukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish Wars: Military and
Political Standoff in 1918-1939 Moscow EKSMO 2004 p285
5) In 1924, 95% of the 384 000 inhabitants of Danzig were
German (see Great Soviet Encyclopedia, volume 20
6) ibid
7) Meltiukhov, op.cit. p 285
8) ibid p 294
9) The crisis year, 1938-1939: Documents and Materials
Volume 2 [2 June – 4 Sept 39] Moscow Politizdat 1990 p 392
10) op.cit. volume 1 [29 Sept 38- 31 May 39] p 351
11) Quoted in Fuller J.F.C. The Second World War1939-
1945, a Strategical and Tactical History. Moscow, Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1956 p37
12) W. Churchill The Second World War in 3 volumes;
Moscow, Voenizdat 1991 Volume 1 Tome 1 p 173
13) The Crisis Year Volume 1 p6
14) ibid. pp 386-387
15) ibid. Volume 2 p 391
16) ibid
17) Documents of Foreign Policy [USSR] 1939 Tome XXII
in 2 volumes Moscow 1992 volume 1 January-August p 339
18) ibid. p 338
19) The Crisis Year Volume 1 p 389
20) ibid pp 438-439
21) Documents of Foreign Policy [USSR] 1939 Tome XXII
volume 1 p 342
22) ibid. p 355
23) ibid. p 363
24) Short History of the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs
1802-2002 in 3 volumes; volume 2: 1917-2002, Moscow,
OLMA Press 2002, p245
25) Archives of Foreign Policy of the Federation of Russia. F.
017a.Op1 p1 d6 l 130
26) The Crisis Year Volume 2 p 403
27) Documents and Materials on the Eve of the Second world
War 1937-1939. Collection of Materials in 2 Volumes.
Volume 2 January-August 1939; Moscow 1981 p 168
28) The Crisis Year Volume 2 pp 192-193
29) ibid p 267
30) ibid p 212
31) ibid p 216
32) ibid pp 228-229
33) Mosley L. On Borrowed Time, How World War Two
Began Translated and abridged by Fedotov; Moscow,
Voenizdat 1972 p 301
34) The Crisis Year Volume 2 p 279
35) Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich. Studia i
materialy. T. III. Warszawa, 1968; pp.262, 287
36) Documents of Foreign Policy [USSR] 1939 Tome XXII
volume 1 p 588
37) [Shirer W.L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Pan
1964 p 659 (Tr.)]
38) The Year 1941 in 2 volumes Moscow ‘Democratia’
International Fund 1998 p 584
39) The Crisis Year Volume 2 p 322
40) Cf.†: Generaloberst Halder F. Kriegstagebuch. T‰gliche
Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-
1942. Stuttgart; W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962-1964; Bd.1.
Vom Polenfeldzug bis zum Ende der Westoffensive (14.8.1939
– 30.6.1940); Stuttgart; W. Kohlhammer VI, 1962; p. 107
41) Short History of the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs
1802-2002 volume 2 p 255
42) Churchill op.cit. pp 179-180
43) ibid
44) Emelyanov I. The Baltic States. Moscow, Bystrow
editor; 2007 p 232
45) ibid p 233
46) Short History of the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs
volume 2 p 255